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The reverend who rode with the Rockers

Most people give "Rockers" a wide berth. These leather-jacketed young people on their heavy motorbikes have formed gangs modelled on America's Hell's Angels.

They are quick with a knife, and the police keep a watchful eye on them.

Psychologists say they are intellectually infantile with a pronounced drive to destroy.

But for Berlin's Pastor Bernd Jürgen Hamann they are first and foremost people — people with a heart, with problems, fears and a longing for security.

It is not only the Christian's love of his fellow man that motivates Rev Hamann, who has been devoting much of his working day to Berlin's Rockers ever

the past eight years — so much so that he has been nicknamed the "Rocker Pastor."

Rev Hamann is himself a passionate motorbike rider, so he has at least one thing in common with these outsiders of society. On a number of occasions he has mediated after Rocker excesses in his parish and often on a city street for juveniles.

One day, he drove up with his motorbike at a pub where the Rockers used to gather, talked to them and eventually gained their confidence. In the end, they not only respected him but made him a member of the gang.

The 38-year-old pastor agreed to join them on condition that he would never be part of any criminal act and that he would never raise his hand against anybody.

It was hard for the Rockers to accept these terms since a Rocker who does not lash out is unimaginable.

Eventually, Rev Hamann started working for his gang in earnest. He managed to get them a place where they could meet and he was always ready to give advice when they came to him with their problems.

But above all, he tried to channel their excess anarchy and pent-up aggressions and to prevent them from breaking the law.

Ha organised drives to the countryside, working on the principle that this would keep them out of mischief.

The group, Rev Hamann has come to realise, is of central importance for the Rockers — a haven and a substitute for the family. It is also a substitute for the rest of the world, which has rejected them and which they therefore despise.

One trait they all have in common is the inability to understand that what they are doing is wrong. It is always the "others" who are at fault. Strength is their only ideal and to demonstrate it they lash out. Seeing the fear they cause in other people gives them self-assurance and makes them feel strong.

Rev Hamann has never had any illusions about the success of his work. He has never thought that he could turn these toughs into a pious flock.

So he has never tried. The emphasis of his work does not lie on teaching Christianity: he sees himself as a social worker rather than as a pastor.

When the first group of Rockers he joined broke up he joined another, stay-

ing with it for four years. Like with the previous group, he gained the Rockers' confidence after much hard work.

He organised leisure activities and visited group members in jail. He baptised the illegitimate children and married the occasional couple.

Above all, he managed to channel their activities and criminal acts dwindled to zero.

This remained so until a new generation in the group took over. The older members left and the young ones that followed opposed the pastor. The basis of cooperation became increasingly untenable and crime began again. Rev Hamann left the group in 1979.

Were all these years of work in vain? The pastor admits that he achieved too little. His wish to turn these men into "decent Rockers" did not materialise.

But he has gathered enough experience which will help him in future projects with the bullyboys. As in the past, he can be certain of the Church's support.

Axel Vörmann

(Nordwest Zeitung, 24 May 1980)

Anti-terror policeman says the risk is measurable

All that the friends and neighbours of Rainer Wolfram, 35, know about him is: he is a civil servant, drives an Opel Ascona and leaves for work at 7 a.m. carrying a brown briefcase.

And this is all they are permitted to know for Herr Wolfram works for a special commando dubbed SEK. SEK is a sort of GSG9 of the Länder (GSG9 being the special federal border police unit trained for anti-terrorist missions).

There is nothing in Rainer Wolfram's appearance that would resemble a James Bond. His hair is thinning and he looks more like a schoolmaster than an anti-terrorist specialist.

"Adventurers are the last thing we need. We're a bunch of highly qualified experts in our field," he says.

His wife Ingrid had the wits scared out of her when he told her five years ago that he had joined SEK.

"But," says Herr Wolfram, "that was only because she didn't know what the job was all about. Sure, it's a risky business, but the risk is calculable."

What makes it calculable is the strict selection before an applicant is permitted to join. Wolfram worked at a police precinct and later as a plainclothes patrolman. When he applied for SEK five years ago he had to undergo extensive tests about familiarity with the law, the ability to endure physical stress, psychological stability and speed of reaction.

Lower Saxony's SEK has 50 men. A team of five is always ready for 20 minutes' notice.

The equipment consists of 12 weapons, communications equipment, explosives and welding apparatus. It is always a helicopter available.

Asked about what is most important for SEK, Herr Wolfram says: "I must get along with each other. I know every one of my 49 comrades out, I must be familiar with their strengths and their weaknesses."

"I must be able to rely on the team; I must be sure that I will hit in the process. You can't waste single seconds thinking about what the others might make."

Lower Saxony SEK has been involved in 70 missions since 1975. They tackled the searching of trains for terrorist searching of homes, hostage-taking and organised crime.

When they are not on duty with SEK, they patrol by car.

The general principle is: two plainclothes patrol work, and one at the clock.

Being prepared for every contingency means that SEK men have to be ready for anything.

Remembers Herr Wolfram: "The was that hostage-taking case in Osnabrück one January. It was freezing and the streets were closed up. The helicopter was out of action because of dark. We had to drive our car. We were worth and the people who must have thought that we were kaze drivers. But we practise this thing twice a week and are proud of ourselves."

He says little about the details of the mission. All he is prepared to say is that the Oldenburg incident is that the robber who took the hostages shot himself.

In another case a group of big pushers had barricaded themselves in a farmhouse. It was hard to get at because of the vicious dogs they had around the place.

"So we got a Customs dog and his dog that was known for its fighting spirit. While the Customs fought with the other dogs we took the house."



Rev Hamann

The German Tribune

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West steers course of unity in Venice



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that the Soviet Union might feel encouraged to undertake similar military ventures elsewhere.

Over Afghanistan the West has clearly failed to close ranks. Verbal condemnation of the Soviet invasion counts for little when there is no action in its wake.

So the task facing the West in Venice was to reconcile the different viewpoints, with a key role being allotted to Bonn.

France may go it alone and Britain promise the earth and fail to deliver, but these are shortcomings America is ready to tolerate than the merest suggestion of deviation from the Western policy line by Gennany.

Given its economic potential, Bonn is regarded by Washington as the cornerstone of the Atlantic alliance in Western Europe, and more is expected of Bonn than of London or Paris.

At the same time no-one could have a keener interest in maintenance of the North Atlantic pact than Bonn. It is the basis of West Germany's very existence as it now stands.

So the success of Venice 2 depended on how well President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt came to terms, especially as it was no secret that their personal relationship left much to be desired.

In recent months there have been times when the impression was created that Bonn's tendency towards greater independence of the United States had something to do with this personal relationship.

Whatever the reasons may have been, the crucial factor is the impression that arises in the United States, and Bonn is currently under a cloud in America.

In the debate on a joint strategy towards the Soviet Union parts will be played by both the Nato decision to modernise medium-range nuclear missile potential in Europe and trade — trade with the Eastern bloc.

The Nato missile modernisation decision, which has been the butt of Soviet attacks on the West, was a remarkable token of Nato's ability to act.

But it has already been called into question. Belgium and Holland are trying to achieve their limited commitment to the joint decision. Italy might also be tempted if any weakening of the stand were to become apparent.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt must make

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Appointment in Venice: The attention of Chancellor Schmidt is briefly caught as he shares a relaxed moment with President Carter and Secretary of State Muskie. In the background is the US national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Photo: dpa)

Saudi Arabia's King Khaled visits Bonn

Not for nothing did Bonn welcome King Khaled of Saudi Arabia with the greatest respect. Chancellor Schmidt was not just being polite when he thanked the King for the responsible oil price policies pursued by Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia is not only the foremost oil exporter but also Bonn's major supplier, meeting a quarter of Germany's petroleum import requirements.

So King Khaled's visit to Bonn and West Berlin was much more than a fairy-tale or picturesque interlude. Very real political issues were involved.

Saudi Arabia does not just want to sell oil; it is also on the lookout for useful economic cooperation in industrial development.

The petrodollars Riyadh holds are a powerful incentive, and not just for the DM2.5bn loan Bonn recently raised in Saudi Arabia.

In view of unrest in the region, Iran and Afghanistan being cases in point, the political importance of Saudi Arabia has assumed vital significance for both Bonn, Europe and the West as a whole.

Saudi Arabia is felt to be indispensable as a reliable partner and a factor for order in the Gulf.

As a number of difficulties arise in connection with the Middle East and the future of Israel, diplomatic skill is called for in cooperation between Bonn and Riyadh.

The two countries were no more on the same wavelength than were President Carter and King Hussein of Jordan in Washington, but both encounters testify to the West's need to intensify its dialogue with the Arab world.

They also show that Arab moderates are banking on the West in view of the Soviet threat to the region. So King Khaled's visit to Bonn can also be considered an auspicious occasion.

Hans Stollhans
(Lübecker Nachrichten, 19 June 1980)

King Khaled of Saudi Arabia is welcomed to Bonn by President

Karl Carstens.

(Photo: Hans Windeck)

Jochen Mass

Continued from page 15

tyres wore down the rear axle tended to get out of control on fast corners I decided to steer clear of every last ounce of risk."

So Mass is a man who has himself and his car under control, who can calculate his likely success and who is now successfully doing so.

At Jarama, for instance, the 22-year-old US driver Eddie Cheever was forced to retire after setting the pace for lap after lap. Cheever was so exhausted he collapsed after he climbed out of the car.

Mass felt sorry for him. "Ha was driving so well I should not have begrudged him a place at the finish — behind me, mind you," he said.

In the Spanish grand prix Mass ranked 14th in training and slowly but surely worked his way to the front. He is an outstanding long-distance man and it showed.

Once he had worked his way into second place all he wanted to do was to last the distance. Alan Jones, the winner, is not a driver to wager his last shirt either, preferring to drive quietly and sensibly.

At one point Jones found he was on his own, pressed by no-one, on the straight. He promptly slowed down, his water temperature having reached 135°C. "It was a miracle the engine didn't let me down," he later said.

He came first, Mass second. But the result still awaits ratification.

Jochen von Oetters
(Die Welt, 3 June 1980)

Rubbish contest

Dustbins may not be an art form but Paderborn, Westphalia, has sponsored an art competition with prizes for the most imaginatively embellished of its 23,000 mouse-grey bins.

Householders have been given the go-ahead to brighten up the street scene by painting dustbins any colour they want.

dpa
(Die Welt, 2 June 1980)

Former POW comes back from official death after 36 years

A 68-year-old man declared officially dead in 1973 has returned to Germany after an absence of 36 years. He is Wilhelm Dyck, a Silesian who was taken prisoner-of-war by the Russians.

He chose to stay in the Soviet Union after inquiries had revealed that his wife and family in Germany were dead. But this information was incorrect.

So was the story told his wife in Dachau, near Munich, who was informed in 1973 that her husband had been blown up by a landmine on the refugee trek in 1944.

But she wouldn't believe it and never abandoned hope. People returning from the Soviet Union had told her sister in

Friedland refugee camp about a Wilhelm Dyck who was alive and well in the Urals.

For months her letters were unanswered. Her husband never received them. Then, in 1978, he wrote and she learnt that he was working in an engineering factory.

He had married again, a woman of German extraction, in 1963, but they had no children and his second wife died in 1977.

So after application procedures and the usual wait he and his first wife have been reunited in Dachau after 36 years.

dpa
(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 30 May 1980)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Attempting to define a US identity

The American Aspen Institute held a three-day session of discussions between American and European politicians in Berlin. These discussions are normally useful, although something of a luxury. But at the present time, they seem almost necessary. The Institute director, Shepherd Stone, invariably thoughtful, prudent and good-humoured, this time persuaded John McCloy to attend. McCloy was the last High Commissioner of the US zone of occupation from 1948 to 1952 and one of the principal figures behind the Marshall Plan. He is a symbol of German-American relations.

The United States is going through an identity crisis. But the crisis is not a new one.

Its ambitions are to be not only the biggest power on earth but also the best, the nation which could impart the richness of its ideals to others.

And this was called into question a quarter of a century ago, when the Hungarians had to fight alone their vain fight for freedom.

The United States and its foreign policy was the subject of this Aspen Institute meeting in Berlin.

The magazine *US News and World Report* says in a recent editorial: "This is the best time for Americans. We are facing an international attack... aimed at eroding the image of the United States, presenting good as bad and bad as good and turning not only our vices, but also our virtues, against us."

A giant surrounded and confused by a pack of dwarves? This was not the impression given by the American speakers at the Aspen Institute discussions.

But it was noticeable that they too were unable to answer all the questions about America today. On the contrary, it was they who asked these questions most persistently.

We were told, for example, that since 1960 the West (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) element in American life, for so long the dominant shaping force, has been losing influence. But this is nothing new to the student of American affairs.

The other point frequently made was that money now seemed to be the only motivation — a criticism which sounds more like a general criticism of the age than an explanation of the specific American malaise now.

So there was little at the discussions to satisfy our curiosity about symptoms of this shift of cultural dominance in the USA — especially as, almost inevitably in such forums, most of the American participants came from the traditional elites.

We were on firmer ground when a competent German analyst referred to the United States' economic difficulties. The strength or weakness of the dollar are connected with the United States' political power.

Inflation means weakening of economic power and therefore of power per se.

What worried most political observers was that the rate of savings in most American households was far lower than in France, Japan and West Germany.

At this point, however, purely economic analysis reaches its limits: beyond that comes the speculative sphere of so-

ciology. What makes the individual American act in this way? To what extent have they turned their backs on the solid principles of the Puritan protestant immigrants which for so long dominated their economic thinking? The only sure thing is that this too weakens the world power.

There are clear inadequacies in the Soviet economic system which correspond to the obvious weaknesses of the United States' economy, but the Soviet Union is tremendously rich in energy and raw materials.

Despite its weak economy, the Soviet Union can keep pace with the United States militarily by concentrating on this area. Its export surplus, even with West Germany, confirms this. According to the CIA, the Soviet Union's energy reserves are such that it does not need to press forward rapidly to the Persian Gulf to meet its energy requirements.

The danger in the view of many experts is that the Soviet Union is now in possession of superiority in a number of areas — more so than at any time in the last five years perhaps — and that it might be tempted to take maximum advantage of this position.

The study of current American weaknesses is a very wide-ranging subject. Perhaps, on closer contemplation, some remarks by American politicians can be revealing.

We have only recently begun to realise that democracy is an ideal to which even Athenian and English democracy only approximated. American democra-

cy, too, relies to a large extent on the fact that a good many citizens only participate passively — not even voting.

But the new process of democratisation means that the rank and file want to have a far greater say. Congress has more than 300 committees and sub-committees on this and that, and there are more projects for laws than there are days in the year.

Courts are overburdened with civil rights cases. "Every group wants to have its rights confirmed." This affects politics.

The Americans are moving nearer to democratic ideals — and the price is a sapping of the country's strength as a world power.

Here reality under the aegis of the American constitution has prospered more than we may notice from afar. The aim, as one participant said, was to rewrite the unwritten constitution of the United States. No one disputed this.

In terms of political culture American does not seem to be becoming more "exotic" to us. And the fact that social security is the fastest-growing item in the American budget also indicates a move towards a European system. Or, to put it differently, some of the peculiarities which helped give America its political end economic strength are being levelled out.

As America itself does not know where its inner changes are leading it, it has become more difficult to predict its friends and its allies.

But, despite its economic weakness at



Seeking answers: John McCloy (left) and Aspen Institute director Shepherd Stone (right).

the moment, no one now says, as they did after the Vietnam War, that America is sick. Rather they are waiting for the reappearance of American strength.

The basic confidence is there, but the details are more problematic. At the Aspen Institute discussions, attended not only by parliamentarians but also by unofficial advisers to the government leadership, the difficulties become clear.

Semi-officially, complaints were made that contacts between Schmidt and Carter were minimal compared to those between Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, who met 12 times in the space of a year.

After the Afghanistan crisis, no one in Europe picked up a phone and asked: can I just come over for talks?

Reduced to the simplest level, a certain historical aspect has become apparent in relations between Europe and the USA: Things have not been as they were recently.

In these talks between West Germans, Americans, French and English it became apparent that on one point the Germans are closer to the Americans than others, on another rather further.

The point of greatest closeness was NATO, which, it was said, was better than its reputation and could not exist without the Federal Republic of Germany: the Soviet Union had nothing to offer West Germany which could induce it to leave NATO and conversely West Germany had nothing to offer the Soviet Union.

The Americans were told, though, that the left of the SPD regarded NATO as an alliance and no more, without sentiment. Assessments among Germans differed here.

The greatest difference between the West German and the American points of view seemed to be on Afghanistan, where the Germans insisted on seeing Afghanistan as a matter for the two super-powers.

A British participant did not see things in such stark terms: a division of labour to preserve the balance at the Persian Gulf was conceivable, he said.

The Americans regarded NATO as something more than just the protection of central Europe. The divergence of interests was evident. If the Soviet Union does not change its policies, pressure on West Germany to play a part in global defence will increase.

It has argued that it is already playing a part in this defence by its financial aid to Turkey, but this will not be considered enough.

The West Germans say that they take the shift in the balance of power in the Middle East very seriously, but that there is a difference between recognising this fact and immediately acting on it.

This puts the finger on the soft point: the West's real capacity to act. For democratic reasons, it is no longer prepared to intervene and its political

ethics bar the way to a policy of though.

Furthermore it is not, or at least not yet, equipped to carry out such a working out at a joint "prevention, not intervention" role.

Here, however, NATO is a form is being asked to do more than it is able to cope with. For the first time the interests of all members are threatened by events outside the area defined NATO territory.

Of course it is also the first time a conflict is taking place between Soviet Union and the Third World.

These are questions on which the views diverge greatly and that it affects German-American relations.

The French, too, see Europe as a choice between voluntary federation and sticking to NATO. They advocate the idea of a *directoire* as de Gaulle. In a previous Aspen discussion, before Afghanistan, an American forward the idea of directorate changing and her directorate from Washington.

What the French mean is a directorate of representatives from Washington, Tokyo, Paris, London, Bonn. As an institution this has a chance, because of the fears of the other members.

In principle the West Germans have nothing against the idea of a directorate, but there are considerations against it. "A directorate is not as it is not described as such."

The French proposal is that it indicates a willingness to act decisively to create a second pillar of the Atlantic Treaty. The idea of a force is also rejected by the French and, despite appearances, by the West Germans.

John McCloy, who was born in the United States, had a long career through 40 years of the United States.

McCloy's appearance underlined the special nature of this session: were discussions preceding the

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THE GENERAL ELECTION

Strauss or Schmidt a choice of personalities as never before

Eleven year party-political conferences are over and done with, many have been approved and, for the most part, already forgotten.

Party leaders have been presented to the country in dramatic terms, as in the early post-war years when the economic set-up and integrations as a member of the West were still controversial issues.

In 1972, for that matter, the choice was presented in drastic terms as one either for or against Bonn's treaties with the East bloc countries.

But never has the choice been framed in such radical and comprehensive terms as by Herr Strauss this time round, in a frontal attack on so-called socialism.

Abroad the socialism he pillories is said to lead to capitulation to the Communists, while at home it allegedly leads to the destruction of constitutional freedoms.

The Shadow Chancellor calls for a virtually revolutionary change in government policies. The Bonn coalition, especially the Social Democrats, counter-claim that Herr Strauss falls short in his capacity for peace.

This is an accusation that appeals simultaneously to calm common sense and to anxious reluctance to consider change of any kind. It is an attempt to bring about polarisation less via political content than via political method, Herr Strauss being used to personify a method.

The polarisation makes it virtually impossible for the Free Democrats to den the mantle of an independent third force. By the same token the liberal wing of the Christian Democrats has virtually been obliterated in the dispute.

In the midst of a general election campaign the country is once more clearly split down the middle into two camps.

The third finding is that foreign policy holds pride of place. Everyone is at odds over peace policy, with the Christian Democrats still on the defensive.

They have yet to explain why their policy not only does not jeopardise the peace but is the better means of keeping it.

Free Democrat Herr Genscher has reformulated his foreign policy articles of faith in view of the impact the issue has assumed and of his party's requirements. He may not have changed his line on any major issue but views shared with the Opposition are hardly in evidence any more. He too is banking on peace policy.

All other issues pale in significance in comparison with the basic of foreign policy. Home affairs in any real sense of the term no longer count.

Even financial and fiscal policies, which might soonest be expected to open up a second campaign front, are explained to a large extent in foreign policy terms.

What shape must, for instance, the financial set-up take if Bonn is to meet its burgeoning international commitments?

It would appear only normal for the country to be divided more starkly into opposing camps at election time, but it is doubtful whether the current polarisation is normal and whether it is in keeping with the state of the party and the current scope for political activity and the inclinations of the electorate.

Robert Held
 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
 Nr. Deutschland, 18 June 1980)

polarisation has, at first glance, reached an extent unusual for West Germany.

There have been times when programmatic alternatives have been presented to the country in dramatic terms, as in the early post-war years when the economic set-up and integrations as a member of the West were still controversial issues.

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original to say any more about either him or his strategy.

Besides, his political pulling-power has been put to the test and found somewhat wanting in two recent state assembly elections, in the Saar and in North Rhine-Westphalia.

The general election already seems predestined to repeat this decision by the electorate. The only factor that seems at all likely to upset the ruling coalition's apparent is (or would be) a feeling that the outcome is a foregone conclusion.

The Social Democrats are right to warn against such levity, but what really concerns the parties at this stage of the proceedings is what the position is likely to be after the poll is over.

The Social and Free Democrats are wondering how they may be able to cope with ever-tougher government tasks, while the CDU/CSU is wondering how it will overcome its bid for power with Herr Strauss at the helm.

It would be a miracle if voters were unaware that this is what currently concerns the parties. The Christian Democrats seem resigned. The Social Democrats appear cool, calm and collected.

Voters appreciate that the election is important but, at least for the moment, they remain unconvinced that it is likely to hold forth much promise of excitement.

Second, the current polarisation is only accepted by part of the public. It is, after all, not convincingly acted out. It is hard to say which is truer of Herr Strauss: his verbal radicalism or his practical circumspection, which verges on relative inability to take decisions.

True enough, it is difficult to formulate a radical counter-position to Helmut Schmidt, a statesman who at times sounds a somewhat schoolmasterly note.

He talks in terms of duties, common sense and facts and tends to reduce alternatives to the dictates of common sense. It is hard to pillory him as a hot-carrier for the Socialists.

He, unlike Herr Strauss, is not a focus of polarisation. The impression he conveys is more one of integration, and it is, moreover, an integration that enjoys the support of many Christian Democrats.

He has cast himself in the role of a statesman for all, a level-headed politician who is capable of reading his fellow-Social Democrats the Riot Act even at an election campaign party conference.

This move was doubtless made to draw a distinction between himself and the blood and thunder of Herr Strauss, but there can be no denying that there has yet to be a Bonn Chancellor to play the part of statesmanlike impartiality to such perfection.

To contradict him is to run the risk of being accused of casting common sense to the winds. On this point the Chancellor no longer makes distinctions between political parties.

Comparison with past election year party-political conferences is strikingly apparent: that the parties seem to regard the current campaign more than ever as a set figure.

The Free Democrats are the sole exception to this rule and for their survival is the issue at stake. Despite polarisation and polarisation the tension and excitement are low-key.

There are two main reasons why. First, the election campaign has been under way virtually ever since Herr Strauss was nominated as opposition candidate for the Chancellorship.

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■ PROFILE

Stoltenberg to be deputy if Strauss wins

Gerhard Stoltenberg, the Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, has agreed to be Franz Josef Strauss' deputy if Strauss is elected Chancellor on October 5.

The decision was greeted with relief by Stoltenberg's friends both in Bonn and the *Länder*, who were waiting for him to enter the election fray.

But they are thinking not so much of election itself as of the period after it — in case Strauss falls and a new debate on the leadership takes place.

Gerhard Stoltenberg is no friend of simple judgements, especially when he himself is concerned.

"I have no definite career plans," he assures his visitor with great composure, probably to underline that he is not consumed by ambition and chasing after the highest offices.

Besides, it would run counter to his cool, north-German temperament if he were to broadcast advances in his career with promises and assurances.

Stoltenberg has never been one to shoot from the hip. His mottoes are caution and avoidance of all imponderable risks. When he is not absolutely sure of something, he prefers to keep silent; and even when he has got everything clearly worked out in his head, he always talks moderately.

SPD floor-leader Herbert Wehner once mockingly described Stoltenberg as *der große Klare aus dem Norden*.

However, on closer contemplation, Stoltenberg's friends could find nothing derogatory about this description — indeed they found it very apt and unintentionally positive.

They thus transformed Wehner's jibe into testimony to the clearheadedness and straightforwardness of their *Land* Prime Minister in Kiel.

Stoltenberg's decision to join the Strauss election team in spite of previous reassurances that he would be staying in Schleswig-Holstein and not taking up a ministerial post in Bonn is a direct consequence of the CDU/CSU's election defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Most of the opposition regarded this as a defeat for Strauss, a result of the anti-Strauss campaign.

When in July last year Franz Josef Strauss was elected CDU/CSU Shadow Chancellor the only prominent north German politician on whose support he could rely was Lower Saxony Finance Minister Walther Leisler Kiep — despite their differences.

Land Prime Minister Stoltenberg and Albrecht, neither of whom had shown any enthusiasm for Strauss' candidacy, conspicuously held back — Stoltenberg because he had promised the people of Schleswig-Holstein before the election that he would remain in Kiel and Albrecht because he wanted to be Shadow Chancellor or nothing.

However, the defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia was a severe blow to the Opposition. The disappointing result underlined the danger that the Opposition might face a similar defeat on October 5 followed by an impending slump.

To reduce the undeniable effect of the anti-Strauss campaign and to prevent a mood of defeatism gripping the party, the CDU executive argued strongly for the election team to be announced long before the election.

When the team was announced a fortnight ago, Gerhard Stoltenberg was given particular prominence.

Stoltenberg says that the short-term aim is, if not election victory, then at least a respectable election result which would banish the danger of a split in the Opposition ranks such as nearly occurred when the CSU threatened to break away in Wildbad Kreuth in autumn 1976.

But Stoltenberg's prominence in the election team will also of course have long-term effects, if the CDU/CSU loses, then in accordance with the party's ruthless practice Strauss will be toppled.

His fate would be the same as that of Kurt Georg Kiesinger 11 years ago and Rainer Barzel and Helmut Kohl since.

Stoltenberg does not disguise his distaste when he talks of previous procedures in the CDU/CSU for appointing people to the highest offices.

The thought that this could happen again obviously appeals him. Of course, as in the past, the problem of double leadership would have to be discussed, the question of who was to hold the highest posts — party leader, Opposition leader, Shadow Chancellor — or whether they should all be held by one man.

But Stoltenberg believes that these debates would only be fruitful if in future they were held without confrontation.

"The policies and leadership of the CDU/CSU have priority. And positions must be filled in accordance with these priorities. Kohl, Albrecht, Stoltenberg — that is not for me to decide."

And to remove all doubts about the strictness of this maxim, he also provides the instructions for use. "I am not saying this and do not intend it as a tactical argument."

If Helmut Schmidt wins the election, Stoltenberg would undoubtedly play a

far greater part in national politics than he has done to date.

Stoltenberg faced a similar decision five years ago. In spring of 1975, he enjoyed strong support in the CDU/CSU. Leading politicians from north and south would have preferred him as Shadow Chancellor to Helmut Kohl.

But when, in the Schleswig-Holstein Land election, he won by only one seat he appeared before the TV cameras pale as chalk.

Had he won convincingly, the Shadow Chancellorship would have fallen into his lap, but all his hopes were shattered. Kohl, the beaming victor in the Rhineland Palatine Land election and party leader, was soon afterwards elected Shadow Chancellor.

Stoltenberg did not commit himself very strongly to Kohl's election campaign, much to the disappointment of his political friends.

But this did not affect his reputation. As deputy CDU leader and party spokesman on finance and economic and energy problems he managed, even in remote Schleswig-Holstein, to avoid the fate of many *Land* Prime Ministers of sinking into comfortable obscurity in high office.

Stoltenberg has been an MP for 25 years, for four years he was Bonn Minister of Research, for 11 years *Land* Prime Minister. This experience now stands him in good stead. For every eventuality, in the foreseeable future, Stoltenberg has the best chances of replacing Strauss as Shadow Chancellor.

Stoltenberg's mastery of his field — finance and economics — is highly thought of, even in the Bonn coalition. He seems to be systematically reducing his gaps in knowledge of foreign policy — not by political tourism but by hard work.

No one doubts his capacity for leadership, making full use of his right to lay down the guidelines of policy. Wherever intellectual lucidity, hard work and clear judgement are required, Stoltenberg can be relied on to perform brilliantly.

On the other hands, he has no trace of charisma or even talent for moving speeches or fascinating presentation of ideas. At meetings people listen to him carefully and believe what he says but they hardly jump from their seats with enthusiasm.

Stoltenberg is an advocate of consensus democracy, not of confrontation, a liberal conservative who, by his stolidity and thoroughness, can influence the political centre — unlike Strauss.

And finally he is credited with the ability to persuade the Free Democrats to join a coalition. It is difficult to imagine affairs and scandals under his leadership.

For all these reasons, Stoltenberg enjoys great confidence in his party. From him the party expects a positive impulse north of the Main line especially where, as the North Rhine-Westphalia result shows, the CDU is most in danger of losing votes.

Strauss has said that if he wins the election, he will appoint Stoltenberg Vice-Chancellor and make him responsible for economics and finance. This is the field in which Stoltenberg wants to concentrate his attacks on the Bonn coalition.

"Despite his great political competence, Helmut Schmidt is virtually neglecting the task of leadership," he says.

He criticises the fact that there was no change of course in financial policy, although the need for this was clear to everyone after the outbreak of the Afghanist crisis.

Everyone knew, he says, that more would now have to be spent on foreign and defence policy. Stoltenberg wonders why Schmidt did not respond to the depressed mood of the people at the beginning of the year and explain the necessity for greater savings.

Instead, Bonn passed laws on noise abatement, youth assistance and other things which will place a burden of billions of DM on the *Länder*.

Stoltenberg says that the Brussels EC compromise on the reduction of the United Kingdom's contributions, and Bonn's inability to cut the cost of this



United in Opposition: Stoltenberg (left) and Strauss.

(Photo: S. W. K. / AP)

from the current budget are signs.

Stoltenberg suspects that the Government will use the promised reductions — as compensation for the EEC decision — also as a means of pressuring the *Länder* into giving a larger share of tax income.

Another criticism is that Bonn is doing enough to reduce the level of government debt, especially as the prospects for high growth rates are dim.

What makes this in his opinion and serious is that the SPD itself is split on the issue. One group insists on need for growth; the other is increasingly sceptical about this.

Stoltenberg considers it "unfortunate" in the circumstances that the SPD committed itself to the 35-hour week. He says that this is an acceptable price for women and older workers but for all workers.

He said the 35-hour week had nothing to do with social progress. It introduced, it would mean an increase in wage costs. This would hamper export and cause great difficulties for mechanized firms.

The highly successful Japanese, he says, work four weeks a year more than we do. He accused the Chancellor of doing nothing about these developments, despite his better judgement.

Stoltenberg's second line of attack on energy policies: "I see no sign of the end of the Bonn government's pre-emptive attack with a constant programme of expanding atomic energy."

Bonn, he said, talked of coal liquefaction as an alternative to atomic energy, knowing perfectly well that development costs would amount to billions of DM, not planned for in the budget.

In foreign and defence policy, Stoltenberg wants to see the CDU stressing the importance of German-American relations.

He is worried about a new anti-Americanism and "counters it with mentalities on the left. He says the CDU/CSU would have to make more efforts to combat this attitude by sending its ideas on peace and defence more effectively.

Stoltenberg sees glaring weaknesses in the SPD in financial policy, atomic energy and NATO policy.

He says: "The great strength of the Opposition in the really central questions, by which the Bonn coalition and financial policy, is that it is not capable of action. It is not capable of internal disputes like the SPD."

INTRA-GERMAN AFFAIRS

Day of Unity a misnomer with uncomfortable memories

The public holiday on June 17 which is known as the German Day of Unity is still a day of discomfort.

Its name is not even correct. The German nation is not united and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future.

Nor do we have any reason to "celebrate" the Day of Unity. After all, what is there to celebrate in memory of an abortive uprising of German workers in East Berlin on June 17, 1953 that was initially put down with tanks and accelerated the East-West rift in central Europe.

Let us not forget that there is a link between the 1953 freedom demonstration and the seething off of the GDR with the Wall that country built in 1961. The discomfort is not new. The political consensus after the 1953 uprising was short-lived, and the disputes over the meaningfulness of this holiday were stepped up — but not because of lack of respect for the sins and the victims of the uprising.

They were stepped up because we found it increasingly difficult from year to year to arrive at a political interpretation of this day.

The many committees that were to decide whether to keep or abolish the public holiday led to nothing. What remained can best be called pangs of conscience. An abortive liberation attempt in which we West Germans had no part anyway was turned into a paid holiday while over there in the other Germany people have to work as on any other day. Small wonder, then, that attempts to abolish the holiday have been made

time and again (some want to have it replaced by the day commemorating the proclamation of our Constitution). But the reasons in favour of retention have gained the upper hand.

We need gestures and symbols if we are to perpetuate the idea of unity. Without them and without such a commemorative day, we would have to worry even more about cities like Jens and Wittenberg disappearing forever in the remoteness of a foreign state.

Even so, there are also sound and honest political arguments in favour of abolition.

When June 17 was proclaimed a public holiday our politicians and their parties (be it rightly or wrongly) were still imbued with the hope of reunification.

Little by little, this hope has been replaced by the realisation that the two Germanies must come to some political arrangement.

The German question cannot be solved by majority decision and even less by force.

Bonn's new *Ostpolitik* and its *Deutschlandpolitik* under Brandt and Scheel (from 1969 onwards) were marked by the realisation that it is necessary to recognise the existence of a second German state and to pursue a diplomacy of patience and small steps.

As a result, the word "reunification" disappeared from the political vocabulary in Bonn.

This being so, the Day of Unity is even more out of keeping with the political realities of the past 10 years. Instead, we now cautiously speak of a

One of the main functions of Bonn's Permanent Mission to East Berlin is looking after West Germans and West Berliners imprisoned in the GDR.

Details of work with prisoners and progress in this field are outlined in a report handed to the Bundestag Committee for Intra-German Relations by Günter Gaus, the Mission head.

The report is dominated by the hope that improvements in German-German relations can be made by cautious, step-by-step diplomacy.

At present, the Mission looks after 366 prisoners, a gratifying figure considering that there were 500 in 1977.

The reduction in the number of prisoners is largely due to discreet efforts to achieve their premature release and to the diminishing number of arrests in connection with transit traffic (1978: 124; 1979: 79).

The reason for these arrests is largely a legal provision peculiar only to the GDR, i.e. "aiding and abetting people in fleeing the Republic".

The GDR terms such activities "anti-state trade in human cargo".

Another reason for arrests is "illegal entry into the GDR". According to the Mission, almost all of these cases involve "careless" or "panic" actions, frequently under the influence of alcohol.

The GDR officially informs the Mission of arrests of West German citizens. If these took place in connection with transit traffic to Berlin, the time lag is usually three to four days.

However, the Mission is dissatisfied with the GDR procedure on arrests of travellers visiting the GDR. Information of this type frequently takes up to two

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Arrested visitors in the GDR: case for a discreet Mission

weeks, and the Mission is working hard to shorten it.

Mission representatives may visit West Germans in prison. But the time lag between filing an application and receiving a visitor's pass is still too long (rarely less than four weeks).

Thirty staff members share the visiting. As a rule, their visit, the prisoner's first, contact with the outside world, takes place in a special visiting room at the prison operated by the State Security Service in Berlin-Lichtenberg.

A member of the Security Service or a public prosecutor is always present.

There are two things the Mission can do for a prisoner: it can look after his personal affairs (informing next-of-kin and employer, drafting powers of attorney and arranging social welfare where necessary).

It can also try to improve conditions of imprisonment. Such contacts have frequently resulted in marked improvements.

Prisoners short of money are given some cash by the Mission so they can make purchases in prison. Every time a Mission member visits a prisoner, he hands over a parcel with tobacco, fruit, toilet articles, etc. worth DM20.

The Mission has had little success in attempts to obtain permission to attend trials.

Those who go along are usually left in peace.

Prisoners have to work and are paid 120 marks a month.

Many are sick, and many suffer psychologically to the point of being no longer fit for prison.

The report states the reason: "The prisoners are at the mercy of an alien social system which they reject they are cut off from their accustomed environment by more than just prison walls."

"Most have been sentenced for acts which, in our legal system, are neither criminal nor wrong. Moreover, the sentences are disproportionately stiff, so that the prisoner must feel that he is being punished in lieu of the Federal Republic of Germany."

Nine of the prisoners cared for by the Mission are lifers; 23 are serving 15-year terms; 30 are in for 10 to 14 years and 106 for five to nine years; 51 are serving sentences of less than five years.

The charges according to the GDR, are 56.8 per cent "aiding and abetting people intent on fleeing the Republic"; 11.7 per cent "espionage"; 3.4 per cent "traffic offences"; 15.1 per cent "border violations" and 5.6 per cent "violations of customs and foreign exchange regulations".

Bonn hopes that the extremely difficult negotiations on a legal aid agreement with the GDR (the difficulty lies in the question of German citizenship) will, at least indirectly, lead to some improvement of the prisoners' lot and, perhaps, reduce their number.

Helmut Harter (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 June 1980)

have dared hope for 10 years ago. It would be unfair to permit the chicanery and repression in the other Germany to obscure our view of the many little gains that have been made with patient diplomacy.

By the same token, we must admit to ourselves that all these improvements have done nothing to promote unity.

is the thesis of the unity of the nation not as much as in danger of palling as was the thesis of a reunification in peace and freedom?

The GDR has already deleted the term "German nation" from its constitution, and it adamantly denies that there is such a thing as two states of a German nation.

Helmut Schmidt once said that the nation retains its right to self-determination for as long as the will to be a nation lasts.

But does our nation still want to be a nation? Does it want unity with the same passion with which the Jews or the Poles have striven for nationhood?

Our Constitution calls on the people to "bring about the unity of Germany"; but how many of our schoolchildren know where the Saale River is?

History has denied us the comfort of demonstrating that a divided nation is unnatural. Past centuries saw the disintegration of the German empire as parts of it seceded and in their turn became nations with a history of their own.

In the same way, the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany could one day become nations in their own right.

The useful formula of two states and one nation need not last forever. Nationhood is not a condition but a process of change.

Are we still a nation? Perhaps we have already ceased being the German nation — both here and there.

Bernd Nellessen (Hannoversche Allgemeine, 14 June 1980)

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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Court confirms legitimacy of the lockout as an employers' weapon

The Federal Labour Relations Court has ruled that lockouts as a countermeasure to selective strikes are permissible. The court headed by the presiding judge, Professor Gerhard Müller, held that, for reasons of equality, employers must have the necessary weapons with which to defend themselves in certain circumstances.

The Federal Labour Relations Court has now passed its third ruling on the legality of lockouts. And for the third time it confirmed them as legitimate measures in labour disputes.

But this third ruling is the most important of the three because it does not concern minor disputes involving very small groups of workers.

The ruling dealt with the 1978 industrial action in Baden-Württemberg's metal industry where employers locked out 146,000 workers in retaliation for a strike by 104,000.

The ruling also dealt with the industrial action in the printing industry where the employers responded to selective strikes by 2,281 workers in four companies with a nation-wide lockout of 32,735 people in 327 companies.

The printing industry said this was a war of annihilation. The doggedness with which the unions have been fighting against lockouts must be seen in historic dimensions.

In the early days of our industrial society, strikes were the only weapon workers had in their fight for better working conditions.

Strikers were frequently beaten up by police and emphy while employers de-

fended themselves with lockouts. It was not until the mid-1920s that labour disputes developed into compromises rather than confrontations.

But the danger of confrontation grew again as the unions developed new strike methods in the form of selective strikes to save strike money and the employers reacted with lockouts. Such action was reminiscent of the early days of industrial action.

The latest ruling by the Federal Labour Relations Court is a milestone of labour relations legislation and social policy in the more than 100-year history of industrial action. It is a Solomon-like ruling which will both satisfy and irritate both parties.

Those who believed that the court would ban lockouts were wrong in their assessment of our society.

The autonomy of the parties to collective bargaining can only be preserved if there is no legal corset and if both sides have equal means at their disposal in negotiations and in labour disputes. And this includes lockouts.

So much for the principle. The employers' argument was sustained by the court and that of the trade unions rejected.

But presiding Judge Professor Gerhard Müller, unlike the employers' associations, attributed different weight to strikes and lockouts.

While the right to strike is a necessary part of labour disputes, this cannot be said in equal measure for lockouts.

The court reasoned that the employers and their associations depend much less

than the trade unions on the instruments of industrial dispute in lending emphasis to their claims.

The balance of power would be upset if the employers had equally effective weapons at their disposal — weapons that would make any strike intolerably risky.

Judge Müller thus aptly described a social situation in which the trade unions are no longer underdogs but a powerful element of a community in which the employers, backed by capital, nevertheless have the power of forcing the unions to their knees in a major confrontation.

The fact that such a development is unlikely in our democratic state is neither here nor there.

The court only drew this limits for industrial action in a free country and a liberal economy.

Key term here is the "proportionality of means" — a term which was used in the second lockout ruling of this court in 1971. In fact, Judge Müller is the corner of this term.

It is to be hoped that the employers in Baden-Württemberg's metal industry will bear this in mind. They used to hit much harder in former years. This time, however, they remained within limits which Judge Müller in his summary called exemplary: when a strike in a specific area involves less than 25 per cent of the workers, the number of locked-out people should be lower.

The printing industry failed to meet this yardstick because the ratio of strikers and locked out workers was 1 to 14.

This was clearly at odds with the principle of proportionality of means and therefore illegal.

The court also ruled the selective lockout of union members only because it violated the constitutional guaranteed freedom of coalition.

It was thus a split ruling, turning down the lawsuit of the Metalworkers' Union and upholding that of the Printers' Union.

The court thus approved of lockouts by distinguishing between various forms.

There was nothing dogmatic about the ruling, and union attorney Gerhard Müller aptly remarked in court: "We must not allow to aggravate the structural and overall facts of life when this is a legal term."

It was a pragmatic ruling based on insight that total balance cannot be achieved in a dynamic society and that no legal system can therefore demand.

Does the ruling therefore make legal certainty in our era?

Employers and unions will have to do a lot of thinking about the consequences of the ruling. The action by the print industry is unlikely to be repeated.

Parties to collective bargaining will have to ponder the question whether strikes and lockouts have not become obsolete in a society where workers and employers can be affected nationwide and because there is a labour dispute in progress in Baden-Württemberg.

Judge Müller has tried to get the parties to collective bargaining to agree on rules for labour disputes.

Out of court, he raised the question whether we should not consider an entirely new system as a means of settling wage deals. But employers and unions are still far removed from such ideas.

On the contrary, they are pondering new strategies and tactics in labour disputes. It is too early to file away as an issue.

Helmut Meißner
(Die Zeit, 13 June 1980)

way because, on the other hand, the staff members' profit sharing has an upper limit whereas the shareholders' doesn't," he said.

But then the staff's participation in the following year and offset against the following year's losses is also limited. They are not free to fork out in bad years.

Their share of losses is carried forward to the following year and offset against the following year's profits. And should there be a longer period of poor business, the staff's share of losses is carried forward to the maximum of two years.

Herr Buddenberg is confident, however, that all this is only theoretical. "We shall try even harder to get out of it again as soon as possible."

Herr Buddenberg hopes that after two or three good years he will be able to start on the second tier of his model.

Once BP Germany has demonstrated its success to the public, he hopes to convert it from a 100 per cent staff subsidiary into a mixed ownership company.

A part of the capital is to be offered to German buyers. Moreover, the staff will then be able to combine profit sharing with participation in the capital of the company. Any staff member prepared to invest half of his profit share bonus in BP shares will be given an equal income of DM50,000 would receive a profit sharing bonus of DM300 in the first phase, to be supplemented by a further DM200 in the second phase.

This means that a worker with an equal income of DM50,000 would receive a profit sharing bonus of DM300 in the first phase, to be supplemented by a further DM200 in the second phase.

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THE EEC

Initial hurdles for an enlarged Community

How soon did the EEC governments take the budget-hurdle that was put in their way by London then they were faced with new problems: Greece's accession to the Community on 1 January 1981 and Spain's (probably) in 1982 are aptly remarked in court: "We must not allow to aggravate the structural and overall facts of life when this is a legal term."

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Herr Buddenberg hopes that after two or three good years he will be able to start on the second tier of his model.

the enlargement, not to mention the other problems that go with it."

The improved trade between the Community and the new members will benefit the already developed region, says Signor Natta, and make the problems of the under-developed ones worse.

Although Roy Jenkins, the president of the Commission, told Spain's Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez last December that all would be done to complete the accession negotiations with Spain by the end of this year, the schedule looked quite different at the end of May.

It provides for the settlement of all "simple" issues by the spring of 1981. The actual negotiations on provisions for the gradual integration in the common agricultural market of Spain and Portugal are to come after the French elections. The same goes for the settlement of the financial issues.

The Accession Treaties are to be signed by mid-1982 at the latest to give the parliaments time to ratify them so that the third enlargement of the Community can take place in 1983 or the beginning of 1984.

The governments in Athens, Madrid and Lisbon hope that joining the EEC will buttress democracy in their countries because no dictatorships may be members. They also expect economic benefits and a "scapegoat" should rapid modernisation lead to social unrest.

And the Nine hope to improve their security by tying the three southern countries to central Europe. They also hope to shore up democracy in the new member nations; but they realise that they will impose an economic burden.

Significantly, both the Bonn Ministry of Economic Affairs and most economic research institutes in Germany have voiced considerable reservation.

As a result of the Association Treaty, Greece has been a quasi member since 1961. This country's economic development in the past few years has been remarkable and there will be no major problem in integrating Greece's agriculture.

But the opening of the Greek market for EEC and EFTA goods as well as products from the developing countries (due to the Community's trade policy) combined with the lowering of tariffs for Japanese and American goods, brings

It is generally felt that the Greeks will do themselves "let's first get in, then we can negotiate about everything."

It is still traumatised by the massive British attempts — first by Harold Wilson, then by James Callaghan and now by Margaret Thatcher — to change the rules once in the club.

The apprehension is one of the reasons why the EC Commission and the Nine are trying to be more thorough in their negotiations with Madrid and Lisbon.

Lorenzo Natta, the Italian vice-president of the Commission who is in charge of the enlargement, does not tend to dramatise — unlike many of his fellow countrymen.

He says: "We must realise that the problems we already have in the Community — unemployment, agricultural surpluses, production and the restructuring of industry — could worsen as a result of

the danger of excessively tough competition for Greece's domestic business.

Moreover, the gradual raising of agricultural prices to Community levels will have an inflationary effect. This cost to the Nine of countering this could be very high.

Portugal, which has roughly the same population as Greece (9 million) is a considerable poorer. Its economic position has been appalling ever since it lost its colonies.

The Community and the individual members have been lending a helping hand in the form of credits since 1976.

Portugal's industry consists mainly of small companies which will now also receive EEC credits to the tune of about DM130m.

A ray of hope lies in the fact that the state-owned French car manufacturer Renault intends to build a plant in Portugal.

After joining, Portugal will have to import food (sugar and animal feed) from the EEC instead of buying it on world markets. This, together with rising agricultural prices at home, will speed up inflation.

Portugal will also contribute to Community surpluses, adding to the wine like and the tomato mountain. It might also add to meat surpluses because the high Community prices would prove an incentive to produce more.

It will have to be subsidised from EEC coffers for many years unless growth is promoted by private investors from the Community and the United States who might be attracted by the low wages.

The membership candidate that really makes the Brussels Eurocrats shake in their boots is Spain, the highest developed and the most populous (36 million) of the three. Some of its industry could well create redundancies in the northern EEC nations.

Ninety three per cent of Spain's businesses employ fewer than 25 people and they are likely to be hardest hit once Madrid has to reduce its tariff barriers.

Spain's unemployment rate, now 10 per cent, is likely to rise. This may, however, be mitigated if such multinational giants as General Motors and Ford carry out their investment plans in Spain. Of course, this would mean additional competition for the established motor industry in the Community.

Spanish shipyards and parts of the steel industry are highly competitive. Growth rates in the country's electronics industry are good. But this branch of business would like to continue enjoying the protection high import duties offer because — like Spain's chemicals industry — it is still in its infancy.


Moreover, British business has so far shown less understanding than their German counterparts for this type of staff participation.

There are, after all, several hundred medium sized companies in this country which have profit and capital participation schemes, and politicians of all parties have been promoting this, though without much success.

Works Council Chairman Bauso, "Our London people have watched with great interest and, indeed, respect the progress we've made in the past few years."

As a result, they now trust us to do the right thing with the profit sharing scheme as well."

Michael Jungblut
(Die Zeit, 13 June 1980)



try — it still feels unequal to the task of competing with foreign products.

Unbiased studies see the major handicap of Spain's industry in the fact that it has for decades been protected from foreign competition and that its management is not competition-oriented.

These problems are further aggravated by excessive social security payments.

To keep unemployment at the present level, Spain will have to create 160,000 new jobs every year.

The integration of Spain's agriculture into the EEC market is a major problem. That country will account for one-third of the agricultural population of the Twelve.

The wine surplus resulting from the three new members is likely to amount to between 5 and 10 million hectolitres a year. But this problem is not as grave as that posed by Spanish olive oil, the production of which involves two million farmers.

Raising the olive oil price to present Community levels would cost the EEC DM3.8bn a year. So far, Spain has been maintaining its olive price at a high level artificially by heavy taxes on all other vegetable oils.

But olive oil, citrus, wine and tomatoes from the three new member nations will also pose a problem because producers in Israel, Cyprus, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia will find it hard to sell on Community markets.

Since the EEC has cooperation treaties with these countries which provide for facilitated imports, they will have to be compensated through financial assistance. Preliminary talks are already in progress.

Freedom of movement for Community workers will not be granted instantly to the new members. A seven-year transition period is envisaged, though Madrid opposes this.

This dispute can only be solved by swiftly creating hundreds of thousands of jobs in the three new member nations themselves through regional subsidies.

A group of Social Democratic Euro-MPs, among them: Heidi Wiczorek-Zeul, Gerd Walter, Gerhard Schmidt and Thomas von der Vring, wants to maintain close contact with MPs in Madrid and Lisbon to ensure that the social consequences of the enlargement are taken into account when drafting the treaties.

This would apply to the consequences to workers in the old and the new member nations. These Euro-MPs hold that this would not hamper but promote the political objectives.

Erich Hauser
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 June 1980)

■ AVIATION

Europeans gain ground
in crucial US market

European aircraft manufacturers seem finally to be making headway in North America. The Munich-made BK 117, a nimble, versatile helicopter, is following in the footsteps of the Airbus, the commercial jet that wiped fond memories of US manufacturers' faces.

For years it has been generally accepted that unless you can sell your aircraft in North American markets your chances of survival in the aircraft manufacturing business are nil.

This is a lesson all European manufacturers have learnt. Marcel Dassault's Mirage jets, although masterpieces of European aero engineering, only made the grade because they sold well in America.

The Airbus did not really start earning big money until sales managers in Toulouse managed to clinch a deal with Eastern Airlines, the major US domestic operator based in Miami.

By the same token (but the other side of the coin), the VFW 614, Germany's first commercial jet airliner, flapped when it failed to establish a foothold in the American market.

This, then, is the hard-nosed commercial background against which the staggering success of the BK 117 Hummel helicopter, jointly designed and manufactured by Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blehm in Germany and Kawasaki Heavy Industries in Japan, must be seen.

The helicopter is taking US markets

by storm, and it is a surprising success story, considering Bell Helicopters of Fort Worth, Texas, reportedly command 60 per cent of world markets.

Ever since the Hummel (it means bumble-bee in German) started whirling its rotor blades life has been topsy-turvy for experienced and successful US aircraft designers and sales staff. They just cannot figure out what has gone wrong with the world.

So far only two prototype Hummels are flying, and series production of the 275km/h (172mph) whirlybird is not due to start until later this year. Yet the output has already been sold until the end of 1983.

What is more, more than 70 per cent of the 135 Hummels that are scheduled for completion in either Germany or Japan over the next three years have been bought by US customers.

Making good helicopters has come to represent good business. In the North Sea alone the demand for helicopters to service offshore operations is expected to be at least 2,000 this decade.

At present fewer than 200 ply between Norway, England, Scotland and the Continental coastline. Worldwide, but excluding the communist countries, the demand for helicopters large and small is expected to increase steadily this decade to a total for the 80s of between 25,000 and 30,000.

There is no mistaking the trend



Vertical rise in the market: the BK 117 Hummel.

towards larger units with a mere substantial payload capacity, and this is what promises to make the BK 117 such a money-spinner.

The 135 advance sales of BK 117 eight- and ten-seater helicopters have been mainly to American customers. The unit price will be \$1,024,000 until 1983, then increasing to \$1,150,000.

For decades German and European aircraft manufacturers have relied on government grants from the taxpayer's pocket to stay in business, but this has not been true of either the BK 117 or its helicopter predecessors from MBB's Ottebrunn, Munich, works.

More than 1,000 of the previous model, the BO 105, have been sold, and about 500 are already in use in 30 countries and four continents. Five hundred is roughly the break-even point, so from now on the BO 105 will be earning good money.

Ironically enough, the world's largest aircraft manufacturer, Boeing of Seattle, runs a BO 105 from Munich as its works and VIP chopper and net, as might be expected, a Bell, a Sikorsky or, for that matter, a Boeing.

And there is no present prospect of the BO 105 being ending either, although the Munich manufacturers have had their difficulties at times.

The BO 105's teething troubles undoubtedly included engine failure and maintenance costs that were too high. But Kurt Pfeiderer, head of MBB's helicopter division, says:

"We anticipate sales of 1,500 units in all over the years to come and now reckon 2,000 BO 105s sold is no longer mere wishful thinking."

Herr Pfeiderer is a canny, cautious Swabian and not the sort of man given to giving less than his considered opinion. So his sanguine forecast carries weight.

Unlike the BO 105, the BK 117 is first and foremost a multi-purpose helicopter for civilian use. It is 13 metres long, 3.84 metres tall and has a range of 545 kilometres, making it an ideal executive whirlybird.

This is not to say there will never be a military version or versions. There is, in any case, no aircraft to rival the helicopter for versatility and the speed at which it can be converted.

Like its predecessor, the BK 117 will be used in many cases for air-sea rescue and disaster relief operations. In others it will, again like the BO 105, be used as a police helicopter.

MBB and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, who signed an agreement to join forces in manufacturing the versatile BK 117

in 1975, opted for the joint-head principle that has proved successful in the BO 105.

In this respect the Hummel is identical with the military version of the BO 105. Power is provided by two Lycoming LTS 101-650 B1 shaft engines developing 650 shaft horsepower, or 485 kilowatts, each.

Many other details were taken from the BO 105, including the tailfin and the stabiliser, but these were redesigned for the BK 117.

The manufacturers sincerely hope as a result the new chopper will have fewer teething troubles than its predecessor.

The first BK 117 prototype made its maiden flight in Ottebrunn, Munich, on 13 June 1979. The first 6 to 10 to be delivered in 1981.

In 1982 a further 50 to 60 will follow, and by 1983 annual unit production should have reached 100.

"We are counting on building at least 1,000 BK 117s in the years ahead of course, on selling them too, much more important," says Herr Pfeiderer. His optimism is based on sound market research. The confidence in the BK 117 has taken about 10 years to build, says Pfeiderer.

He and his Japanese opposite numbers are quietly confident the BK 117 will prove more than a match for Bell 222, a 10-seater all-rounder.

At the Las Vegas helicopter fair last year options were taken out on 30 BK 117s straight away, even though only a mock-up was on show.

There is another important reason for this flying start. "We never imagined success would be so far as it has been," says MBB's Kurt Pfeiderer, "that the distance between Germany and Japan collaboration with Kawasaki would prove so fair and good."

"From our point of view the BK 117 success story so far has been a small extent to the exemplary cooperation between our two companies in handling the project."

The first balance sheet is impressive. The European Airbus has already been sold as a brisk seller and serious competitor of US aerogiants. The BK 117 triumph now seems about to be followed by a BK 117 boom.

US competitors take a jaundiced view of the entire operation because of the man-Japanese co-production seems to make more of a mark on American markets than either country could expect to do on its own.

MBB and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, who signed an agreement to join forces in manufacturing the versatile BK 117

THE ENVIRONMENT

Concern over increasing
carbon dioxide count

Two dozen scientists and politicians from 15 countries met recently at Aspen Institute workshop in West Virginia to discuss the alarming increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, an increase of 15 to 20 per cent since the turn of the century.

Carbon dioxide is generated as a by-product of combustion. In the quantity in which it exists in the atmosphere it does not yet, as far as is known, represent a danger to either animals or man.

So there are no statutory limits to the amount that is poured into the atmosphere. Yet in the long term a continued increase in the carbon dioxide count would well bring about a crucial change in the earth's heat balance and climate.

Latest surveys indicate that the carbon dioxide is fairly evenly distributed in the atmosphere, where it allows short-wave solar radiation through to the earth's surface but prevents the outflow of long-wave infra-red radiation reflected from the surface of the earth.

This is the so-called hothouse effect first described in the 19th century by the Swedish scientists. If the carbon dioxide continues to increase, average earth temperatures will increase too.

Consequences of this foreseeable development and essential counter-measures were discussed at the Berlin gathering.

The first BK 117 prototype made its maiden flight in Ottebrunn, Munich, on 13 June 1979. The first 6 to 10 to be delivered in 1981.

In 1982 a further 50 to 60 will follow, and by 1983 annual unit production should have reached 100. "We are counting on building at least 1,000 BK 117s in the years ahead of course, on selling them too, much more important," says Herr Pfeiderer. His optimism is based on sound market research. The confidence in the BK 117 has taken about 10 years to build, says Pfeiderer.

The current atmospheric carbon dioxide count of roughly 0.033 per cent could be expected to double over the next 50 years, he said, resulting in a mean global temperature increase of between 1.5 and 4.5 degrees centigrade.

Such estimates were, he admitted, fraught with uncertainty. The role of the oceans as carbon dioxide absorbers had not to be clarified at all satisfactorily.

A temperature increase of less than one degree, he said, could be assimilated by the earth without undue difficulty or serious consequences.

Yet estimates assume that temperature increases at the earth's poles will be three to four times above average, resulting in polar icecaps melting, higher sea levels and changes in climate circulation.

This would mean changes in rainfall, evaporation and ground humidity distribution, with attendant consequences for agriculture and food output for a growing world population.

There would be countries that gained from this temperature change and others that lost. The United States, for instance, would probably be a loser, whereas India seemed likely to prove a winner, with more rainfall.

In the Soviet Union, the growth period would be longer but rainfall would be down. So the carbon dioxide problem, conference delegates stressed, is a universal problem.

Joint action is necessary, and three possibilities were discussed at the conference. The first was that of filtering

carbon dioxide and other harmful substances out of exhaust fumes.

Technically this is feasible, but what is then to be done with the enormous amounts of waste carbon dioxide? Proposals ranged from pumping them into the ocean's lower depths to sealing them in disused coal seams.

But this possibility, as Professor Bach pointed out, is extremely uneconomic. The second was for mankind to adjust to the expected climate changes, but the Berlin conference felt this was most unrealistic.

The earth is so overpopulated there is no longer enough room for mass migration and it remains to be seen whether genetic engineering could produce crop plants suited to be change in climate.

So the conference was unanimously in favour of the third option, the development of prevention strategies. Primary energy must, for instance, be used more rationally to reduce to a minimum the increase in fossil fuel consumption.

The range of energy options must also be extended. Coal, gas, oil and wood must increasingly give way to non-fossil fuels and solar energy, wind power and maybe atomic energy to help solve the problem.

The conference wondered how this strategy might be implemented in the Third World in view of the developing countries' pressing need to catch up with the industrialised world.

Rashmi Mayur of the Urban Development Institute, Bombay, said what mattered first and foremost in the Third World was to make people aware that a carbon dioxide problem existed.

In addition to the enormous information shortfall and white spots on the research map as to, say, the developing countries' carbon dioxide output and the extent to which destruction of tropical rain forests contributes towards carbon dioxide imbalance, developing countries were caught in a cleft stick.


There could be no doubt that as a result of global climate changes agriculture in most countries in the world's hunger belt would face even tougher insoluble problems.

Yet at the same time these were the very countries that needed to step up

energy consumption if they were to make any headway towards development. Walter Orr Roberts, director of the Aspen research programme on food, climate and the future of the world, wondered whether the developing countries, having already paid a high price for atmospheric pollution by the industrialised world, were not entitled to the first option on such cheap energy as remained. There must certainly be a plan of action stipulating carbon dioxide output ceilings, with quotas allocated on moral grounds to the various parts of the world.

Marion Kern

(Der Tagesspiegel). One of the main attractions at the Hanover show to this date (14 June 1980) firemen's ladder which can extend to 63 metres.

Firefighting robots on show
at international fair

Firefighting robots were among the exhibits at Interschutz '80, the international firefighting and disaster relief trade fair in Hanover.


More than 460 exhibitors from 17 countries demonstrated on more than 66,500 square metres (17.25 acres) of floor space the entire range of emergency service devices.

They included the Scorpion, a robot handling device developed by Karlsruhe nuclear research centre and commissioned by the Bonn Research Ministry.

At the Hanover fair this sturdy tracked vehicle could be seen trundling up to a fireman and gently lifting the helmet off his head.

In practice the Scorpion has already been used in reactor emergencies in Austria and the Netherlands.

Red is the color of the fire brigade and it was the colour of most exhibits. They fascinated both the experts and the general public.



Remote-controlled fire extinguisher with camera shows its paces at the Hanover show. (Photo: Wilhelm Hauechtl)

Handelsblatt

WIRTSCHAFTS- UND FINANZZEITUNG

They included a sophisticated, high-speed airport fire engine costing over DM1m and veteran hand pump devices as used between 1450 and 1800.

The DM1m air crash tender can pump 9,000 litres of water and 1,000 litres of foam on to the blazing plane. It weighs 28.5 tonnes and has automatic controls.

Disaster relief exhibits ranged from field hospitals to meat on wheels. The latest fire engines pointed the nozzles of their hoses in impressive array. Protective clothing for all manner of uses was on show.

An Italian fire engine was claimed to ensure 100-per-cent success in fighting fires caused by carburetors, and Molotov cocktails.

Then there is a 150-tonne Bundesbahn crane that beats a 63-tonne diesel locomotive as though it were a toy train. Two men can make the gigantic device turn 180 degrees effortlessly.

The locomotive is then lowered on to the track to a round of applause. Its bogies have come to rest on this track true to the nearest millimetre.

Firefighting demonstrations on a 1:10 scale model size could be seen in a neighbouring hall where Wiesbaden firemen showed model firefighting exercises as they will have taken place around 1910 and between 1500 and 1850.

Collectors will also have been delighted by displays of helmets, uniform badges, model fire engines and firefighting postage stamps.


The most expensive item of this kind was a French helmet costing DM300 and made of high-grade steel. A scale model of a steam-powered Mississippi fire engine was on sale at about DM100.

Ehrenfried Markert
(Handelsblatt, 11 June 1980)

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Friedrich Nietzsche
(Photo: Interpress)

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■ MINORITY GROUPS

School bussing project aims at quickening integration

The North Rhine-Westphalia city of Krefeld is running a pilot system of bussing migrant children in an attempt to extend integration of schools.

Finance is provided by the municipality, the Land government in Düsseldorf and the Education Department in Bonn.

A typical pupil affected by the scheme is Sibel Alper, an eight-year-old girl born in Turkey.

The Alpers live in the city centre, in a street with friends or relatives in every other house.

Statistically, one in two or three houses in this part of the city is tenanted by Turks.

But Sibel does not go to school in her own borough. Together with other Turkish children, she is bused every morning to an elementary school.

This school is several kilometres north of her home, in a green part of the city, dominated by gardens, trees and upper class housing.

After four years of elementary schooling, 90 per cent of German children go to the *Gymnasium* (secondary school preparatory to university) or *Realschule*, which is geared more towards the trades and other non-academic occupations.

In another two years, Sibel, too, might be one of these 90 per cent. Her teachers say that she will have no problems coping with one of these two types of secondary schools.

The objective of the scheme is to do something practical about integrating foreign children.

Krefeld is so proud of its project that its Mayor Hansheinz Hauser (CDU) issued an information brochure which he wrote himself.

It says: "Krefeld was probably the first German municipality to have unanimously decided in favour of an educational integration of foreign children — and that as far back as 1974."

Equipped with a good education, Herr Hauser says, out foreign children will be enabled to make the best use of the opportunities in this country.

Krefeld is typical of many cities in Germany's industrial conurbations. Of its population of 230,000, 22,000 are foreigners, mostly Turks, Greeks, Italians, Portuguese and Spaniards.

In the past eight years, at least one out of four children born in Krefeld had non-German parents.

Very few foreigners opt to return to their home countries — a nationwide trend.

Mayor Hauser says: "The fluctuation of former years has now given way to an extended stay. For many foreign children, Krefeld is thus not only the place of birth but also their permanent home city."

Unlike many of his opposite numbers in other German cities, Mayor Hauser does not shirk a political decision.

"Our problem now is not to decide how many foreigners are to live in Krefeld but how they are to live," he says.

But it is a long and thorny road from recognising a political problem to implementing the remedy in everyday life.

The Krefeld experiment is a venture into new territory, and not everybody approves of it.

Education Department official Eike-Dieter Schäfer, still somewhat bitter about the attitude of rejection he met

with in various quarters, says: "Until about three years ago we stood with our backs to the wall because nobody dared tackle a deliberate political integration of foreign children in German elementary schools. All municipalities around us stuck to the system of preparatory classes for foreigners."

What he meant was the official policy of the *Länder* (supported by Bonn) that separates foreign children by nationality and then makes them attend special classes for two or four years or perhaps even for all of the nine years of compulsory schooling.

By and large, the bitterness in Krefeld has given way to satisfaction over the successful experiment which has been supported by all parties in the City Council and which other municipalities still have before them.

Meanwhile, the official policy towards foreigners has changed and "integration" is everywhere — as it in Bonn or the *Länder*.

It is also in with the big business associations and the churches. It is the policy of the *Länder* of both political colours.

But even on a lesser plane, there is a change in everyday life at school.

It has always been unclear what the "preparatory classes" are supposed to prepare the foreign children for: were they to be prepared for an eventual return to their parents' home country and schooling there or were they to be prepared for a regular German school?

No progress has been made with such classes — neither in Krefeld nor elsewhere.

One teacher says: "The children's performance deteriorates all the time."

Other municipalities have meanwhile come to realise that things cannot continue as they are. As a result, educationists are flocking to Krefeld to get a first hand idea of how that city's pilot project works.

These educational policy makers will have to decide on the development of

our school system in the 1980s. But while they are eager to see how Krefeld is faring, the political and educational barriers in many German cities are such as to make it almost impossible to emulate the Krefeld project.

Though CDU-governed, Krefeld has had the support of all political parties in implementing a strict school plan which has been in operation for the past 10 years.

The city's chief administrator of the educational system, Paul Pingen, explains: "Since the early 1970s, we have systematically reshuffled foreign children whenever the quota of foreigners in a particular city district or street reached more than 20 per cent. Sibel Alper is one of these 'overhang' children."

("Overhang" is Krefeld officialese for an excessive quota of foreigners in any given area of the city.)

In practical terms this means that the neighbourhood school will accept a maximum of 20 to 30 cent foreigners. All other foreign children must be divided up among schools.

More and more of those parents who have decided to stay in Germany per-

manently have taken their children of Greek or Turkish language class.

Krefeld city planners say that this trend among foreign parents to their homes to where their children school is.

This would seem to be an ideal of frictionless integration worth emulating — especially in view of the relative importance of the period of elementary schooling for the child.

But Klaus Klemm, one of this city's most outstanding educationists, says about a too hasty imitation of Krefeld model to get out of a pot-dilemma.

He considers it more than doubtful whether German parents in Düsseldorf or Stuttgart will put up with the "import of problems" through foreign children in German schools.

He cites a letter which German parents sent to the school authority in Lünen: "We shall not stand by while irreparable damage is done to the chances of our children who will become the 'lost minority'."

This letter could have been written by parents in any German city.

Herr Klemm has found that German parents are looking for a school where most children are foreigners. They loath to send their 7-year-old daughter to a school four kilometres away from home only so that she should go to school with fewer foreign children," says.


Moreover, the daily bussing imposes considerable strain on the children.

His most important objection to the bussing system and the reshuffling children in elementary school to the quota of foreigners below 20 per cent is that there can never be genuine integration "if the school happens in the morning and the parents pick up the child in the afternoon."

Sibel Alper is an example: she is picked up by a Turkish teacher and taken to the appropriate classroom. Now, in the third grade, German is also taught jointly.

This being taken from one classroom to another is a cause of unrest for both children and teachers. It is the children themselves who want to be together as much as possible.

More and more of those parents who have decided to stay in Germany per-



(Photo: Pressphoto AG)

SCIENCE

Dispute over 'body-clock' experiments

Tests by behavioural scientists on the human "biological clock" are to end because the institution involved is to be closed.

The Max Planck Institute at Erling-Andechs, near the Ammersee in Bavaria, has been carrying out the experiments since 1964 with volunteers spending time in an underground bunker cut off from their normal environment.

Some of the findings show that our bodies have 25-hour cycles, not 24-hour.

However, the justification for closing the institute, according to Max Planck Society spokesman Robert Gerwin, is that the pioneering work has largely finished or is being continued at other universities.

This is disputed. A member of the team involved in the experiments, Professor Rüdiger Wever, says: "We had not noticed that our work was anywhere near finished."

The volunteers taking part in this test spend four weeks in an underground bunker which used to belong to the Wehrmacht. In this time, they are completely cut off from all contact with the outside world.

The experiments have been going on since 1964 and in this time 237 people have spent between 28 and 89 days underground.

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Life in an underground bunker: 25 hours in a day?

(Photo: MPO)

The project team is led by Professor Jürgen Aschoff. He will retire when the institute closes, and no successor has been found.

Wever says that the conditions for the experiments in this bunker are ideal. It is completely cut off from light and noise from outside. The only connection with the outside world is a slit through which food and letters are passed.

Aschoff, 66, has long been interested in inner processes in the human body. He studied medicine at Freiburg University. Then he specialised in the study of biological rhythms: do animals and human beings live according to outer clocks such as the change from day to night? Or is their behaviour influenced by their own inner clocks? And if so, how do they work?

To answer these questions, Aschoff

needed to be able to isolate people completely from the outside world. In the bunker, people live according to their own notions of time. They can go to bed whenever they feel tired and decide on their daily timetable independently of the rhythm of their environment.

Wolfgang Mielthge, a 30-year-old psychologist, was one of the volunteers. Before going to sleep he had to put electrodes on his head so that the structure of his sleep could be recorded. During the day, Mielthge took concentration and reaction tests. He also gave urine samples.

He describes his time in the bunker: "I decided my own daily rhythm. When I felt really awake, I got up. I had no orientation whatever and had only my own rhythm to go on."

He said he was only bored for an hour during the entire four weeks. He worked on his doctoral dissertation, listened to records and read. "I never felt any anxiety. But I probably would have been bored if there had been no pressure to work."

Like all the other volunteers, Mielthge was asked to tick off the days. When according to his reckoning 25 days had passed, the test was over.

Mielthge's results are typical of those of many volunteers. His daily rhythm differs from the normal 24-hour rhythm. Mielthge's rhythm was a 27-hour one. In other words, his inner hour was three hours behind in these conditions.

As the biological clock does not have an exact 24-hour rhythm, scientists talk of "circadian" periods. The average circadian period of the volunteers was 25 hours, one hour longer than the ordinary day.

In these conditions of isolation, the relation between temperature and day-night rhythm also changes. Under normal conditions, our body temperature is highest in the evening and lowest in the early morning.

In the case of these volunteers, the temperature maximum occurred only a few hours after the day began and the lowest body temperature was a short while after the volunteer fell asleep.

Could it be then that the sleeping-waking rhythm and body temperature are regulated not from one but from several clocks? Observation of two thirds of the volunteers seems to confirm this.

Among these volunteers, the temperature curve has a 25-hour rhythm, but the times of sleeping and waking are completely out of cue. Some volunteers had 18-hour days, others prolonged their period of activity and rest to 30 hours.

The amazing thing is that none of the volunteers even noticed this. And there

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Short-sighted people 'are cleverer'

Short-sighted people are cleverer. Tests in several West German *Länder* have shown that although only 15 per cent of the total population are short-sighted, the proportion of the myopic among intellectuals is two to three times higher.

Professor P.D. Steinbach of the Düsseldorf Marienhospital, provided a plausible explanation of this phenomenon in the Stuttgart medical magazine, *Deutschen Medizinischen Wochenschrift*. Steinbach says that short-sightedness and intelligence are connected as the result of a sifting of genetic variants. This means that the short-sighted individual, because of his frailty, concentrates on activities where short-sightedness is no hindrance.

He is therefore more likely to turn to academic studies than to sports. In this way, eyesight, like other physical factors such as strength, sensitivity to heat and to light, becomes effective as a classifying factor.

The final result of this sifting as a result of genetic factors is a certain biological type in which characteristic combinations of physical features are frequently found. These in turn are connected with typical behavioural characteristics.

What the south Germans call *Grossköpfe* and the Americans egg-heads are basically no more than characterisations of members of a particular social class or profession on the basis of their typical features, which distinguish them from other comparable groups.

Short-sightedness is very often found in conjunction with tallness, weakness of the connective tissue, flat feet and stomach and kidney subsidence.

The reason that such characteristic features become more pronounced from one generation to another is, according to Steinbach, that as our external living conditions become standardised genetic factors assume ever greater importance.

Biological social types and the proportion of short-sighted people in certain

groups will increase, because people from similar social backgrounds tend to intermarry.

A study at a Berlin schools produced an impressive illustration of the connection between short-sightedness and intelligence.

Thirty-five per cent of grammar school pupils were short-sighted, but only nine per cent of special school pupils and secondary modern school pupils without the leaving certificate suffered from short-sightedness.

In all, the proportion of short-sighted children of graduates, civil servants and office workers was high.

There was also a correlation in size. Children who were above average height when starting school but not short-sighted tended to become short-sighted more frequently than other children.

The general opinion now is that children do not become short-sighted because they read a lot — they read a lot because they are short-sighted.

Angela Heck

Translated by Angela Heck (Dtsch. Wochenschrift, 7 June 1980)

(Photo: S. Heydekampf)

Eventually, punk music became cbiic as a sub-species of rock. This developed into the new wave music, and the punks

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'(Hambürger' Abendblatt, 7 June 1980)

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ded all school-going children in a
borough and if there is no skimp-

dpa
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 13. Juni 1980)

men, from all social strata. But only the

The Dortmund Institute doubts that the "parents" wish to continue the in-



The age of punk

world championship cavalcade were, say the Australians or the Africans.

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...beyond the frontiers of national TV organisations' could be held.



The clincher: Horst Hrubesch heads the winning goal past Belgian goalkeeper Jean-Marie Pfaff to give West Germany the championship. (Photo: dp)

Wolfgang Bergmann, 4.60 metres in the pole vault and 66.1 metres in the javelin, all strictly according to schedule, according to Kratschmer.

But for the time being his personal financial will remain at 8640 points a

open to me now Moscow has gone by the board." *Gerd Holzbach*
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 14 June 1980)